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Abstract—The extent to which growth reduces global poverty has been
disputed for 30 years. Although there are better data than ever before,
controversies are not resolved. A major problem is that consumption
measured from household surveys, which is used to measure poverty,
grows less rapidly than consumption measured in national accounts, in the
world as a whole and in large countries, particularly India, China, and the
United States. In consequence, measured poverty has fallen less rapidly
than appears warranted by measured growth in poor countries. One
plausible cause is that richer households are less likely to participate in
surveys. But growth in the national accounts is also upward biased, and
consumption in the national accounts contains large and rapidly growing
items that are not consumed by the poor and not included in surveys. So
it is possible for consumption of the poor to grow less rapidly than
national consumption, without any increase in measured inequality. Cur-
rent statistical procedures in poor countries understate the rate of global
poverty reduction, and overstate growth in the world.
I. Introduction
A central issue in the debate about globalization is theextent to which economic growth reduces poverty.
When economic growth benefits everyone in equal propor-
tion, the incomes of the poor grow at the same rate as does
mean income. The fraction of the population whose incomes
are below a fixed poverty line must then decline with
growth, although the rate at which it does so depends on the
position of the poverty line in the income distribution, with
growth in the mean generating more rapid poverty reduction
the greater the fraction of the population who are near the
poverty line. If economic growth is unequally distributed,
the effects of growth on poverty reduction will be less (or
more) depending on whether the incomes of the poor grow
by less (more) than average. So much, but perhaps not much
more, is common ground.
Early debates on growth and poverty, much influenced by
Simon Kuznets’s (1955) dictum that inequality would in-
crease in the early stages of development, tended to argue
that growth did little to reduce poverty. Writing in the
1970s, Chenery et al. (1974), Adelman and Morris (1973),
Fishlow (1972), and Bardhan (1973) all argued that eco-
nomic development either left the poor behind or actually
made them worse off; see Cline (1975) for a contemporary
survey. Taylor and Bacha (1976) constructed a growth
model of “Belindia,” a tiny rich Belgium in a huge poor
India, as an example of “the unequalizing spiral” that they
saw as fitting the stylized facts of development. Ahluwalia,
Carter, and Chenery (1979), who were among the first to
measure global poverty using now standard methods, ar-
gued that the effect of growth was limited both by the
relatively low growth of the poorest countries, and by
expanding inequality within them. When Fields (1977)
argued that in the Brazilian economic miracle of the 1960s
the poor had actually done better than average, he was
robustly challenged by Ahluwalia et al. (1980), who showed
that Fields’s conclusions were not warranted by his data,
which were consistent with an uninformatively wide range
of differential growth rates of incomes of the poor and
nonpoor. This was surely the truth of the matter; in 1980, the
data were not available to provide a clear answer to the
question whether the poor did better, the same, or worse
than average during the unprecedentedly high rates of
growth in many poor countries in the immediate postwar
period. Researchers were forced to rely on a scattering of
published distributional measures, whose provenance and
reliability were often unclear; and indeed, Kuznets’s famous
article used distributional data for only three rich countries,
with a smaller amount of information for three poor ones.
The paper by Ahluwalia et al. (1980) was an important
impetus to the establishment of the Living Standards Mea-
surement Study (LSMS) at the World Bank. The original
purpose of the LSMS was to measure the living standards of
the poor in a standardized way, to remedy the paucity of
distributional data in the third world, and to set up a system
of household surveys that would both support and cross-
check the national accounts, as well as replicating for living
standards measurement what the UN’s System of National
Accounts (SNA) had done for national income accounts
around the world; see for example Pyatt (2003).
Thirty years later, the data situation has been transformed.
There are two key innovations. First, internationally com-
parable national accounts, based on purchasing power parity
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(PPP) exchange rates, allow comparisons of average living
standards across countries in a way that is not vitiated by the
gross inadequacies of conversions at market exchange rates.
Making comparisons in PPP units corrects, or at least
diminishes, the gross understatement of living standards in
poor countries relative to rich, and removes the spurious
component of growth among poor countries that comes
from the elimination of those differences with economic
development. PPP exchange rates were first used for global
poverty estimates by Ahluwalia et al. (1979), and their use
is by now almost universal. Second, there has been an
extraordinary growth in the number of household surveys
available to the research community, including several
dozen LSMS surveys. For example, the World Bank’s most
recent set of poverty calculations use data from 297 surveys
from 88 developing countries (Chen & Ravallion, 2001).
Deininger and Squire (DS) (1996) have collected and tab-
ulated data on more than 2,600 Gini coefficients as well as
many measures of quintile shares; the WIDER extension
includes more than 5,000 Gini coefficients. The unit record
data from many household surveys are now routinely avail-
able to researchers, including such previously inaccessible
troves as nearly 20 years of data from the Indian National
Sample Surveys back to the early 1980s. Notable by its
exclusion is any similar access to Chinese official surveys.
Yet the controversies are no more settled than they were
30 years ago, although there is certainly more common
ground among economists than there is in the world at large.
The professional consensus, based on the DS data and on
work by them and many others, is that, contrary to
Kuznets’s hypothesis, and contrary to beliefs in the 1970s,
there is no general relationship between inequality and
growth, and certainly not one in which growth systemati-
cally widens inequality, as would be the case of growth left
the poor behind. From this, two important propositions
follow. First, at least on average (and much depends on
whether we are averaging over countries or people), growth
is good for the poor (Dollar & Kraay, 2002; Ravallion,
2001), as is the growth that is arguably generated by greater
openness (Berg & Krueger, 2003). Second, and again on
average, the fraction of people in poverty should decline as
if growth were neutrally distributed. In particular, the rela-
tively rapid growth in the developing world from 1980 to
2000 must have brought about a rapid reduction in the
fraction of the world’s population that is poor. And indeed,
calculations using the Penn World Tables combined with
inequality measures—the technique first used by Ahluwalia
et al. (1979)—show rapid poverty reduction in the 1980s
and 1990s; see Bhalla (2002), Sala-i-Martin (2002), and
Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002). According to these
calculations, not only has the proportion of poor in the
world declined, but the decline has been rapid enough to
offset population growth, so that the actual number of poor
people in the world has fallen. According to Bhalla, the first
of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals,
halving the number of people living on less than $1 a day
between 1990 and 2015, had already been met when the
goal was announced.
These optimistic calculations are starkly at odds with the
World Bank’s numbers on global poverty. The World Bank,
which is endorsed by the UN as official scorekeeper for the
poverty Millennium Development Goal, uses household
survey data to measure the living standards of the poor,
ignoring national accounts estimates, and its calculations
show relatively little poverty reduction in the 1990s. Chen
and Ravallion (2001), which provides the details of the
Bank’s calculations, shows a reduction in the proportion of
the poor living on less than $1 a day from 1987 to 1998
from 28.3% to 23.5%; they argue that this modest reduction
comes, not from any expansion in inequality within coun-
tries, but from relatively slow growth in mean consumption.
Across their 88 countries, the population-weighted rate of
growth in mean consumption was only 0.90% from 1987 to
1998, compared with 3.3% growth in real per capita con-
sumption in the Penn World Tables over the same period.
These estimates exclude the latest (1999–2000) Indian data,
whose inclusion will increase the growth of the survey
means over the 1990s. There remains a large gap between,
on the one hand, the direct assessment of the growth of
consumption of the poor through surveys, and on the other
hand, the growth that is implied by the growth in average
accompanied by no general increase in inequality.
The plethora of new data has not resolved the contro-
versy, because the new sources are mutually contradictory.
According to direct measurement in household surveys,
growth among the poor of the world has been sluggish
compared with the average growth rates of the countries in
which they live. Yet there is no documented increase in
inequality that would resolve the discrepancy. If we are to
accept the surveys, growth in the world is a good deal
slower than we are used to thinking from the national
accounts data, and what growth there has been in the latest
two decades has made only a modest dent in the level of
world poverty. If we accept the national accounts, and do
not challenge the conclusion that there is no general in-
crease in inequality nor any correlation between growth and
changes in inequality, then official poverty numbers are
overstated, and we have already made rapid progress toward
reducing poverty in the world. This paper explores these
contradictions empirically with an aim to providing a
sharper characterization and to advancing some first hypoth-
eses about causes and possible remedies.
A note of caution at the outset. Because countries have
vastly different populations, statements about averages of-
ten depend sharply on whether or not they are population-
weighted. A third of the world’s poor live in two countries,
India and China, and the global poverty counts are much
affected by what happens there. When we are interested in
the well-being of the people of the world, and in the effects
of statistical practice and statistical discrepancies on global
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poverty measurements, we must weight by population.
There is no reason to downweight the well-being of a
Chinese peasant relative to a Ghanaian cocoa farmer, nor to
believe that the world is a better place when an African
moves out of poverty and an Indian moves in. However,
many of my concerns are about the relationship between
measurement and the level of development, in which case
the appropriate procedure is to take each statistical system
as the unit, and to ignore population sizes. Beyond that,
many of the political negotiations about poverty, and about
measurement—for example, those in the councils of the
United Nations and the World Bank—are carried on nation
by nation. In consequence, I shall typically present both
weighted and unweighted results.
II. Surveys versus National Accounts: All Countries
In this section, I consider the cross-country and intertem-
poral relationships between survey and national accounts
estimates of consumption expenditure per capita. Many
commentators have noted the (sometimes substantial) dis-
crepancies between survey estimates and their national
accounts counterparts. As we shall see below, there are also
long-standing literatures in India and the United States, not
only on level differences, but also on the fact that survey
means grow less rapidly than means in the national ac-
counts. My analysis and data overlap with those of Raval-
lion (2003), whose main concern is with regional and global
analyses of the statistical significance of discrepancies in the
levels and growth rates of the ratios of survey to national
accounts consumption. For consumption surveys, Ravallion
comes to the optimistic conclusion that the significant dis-
crepancies can be traced back to the disarray in the statis-
tical systems of the transition economies. The lack of
significant differences elsewhere reflects the large cross-
country variation in the ratios, as well as the fact that when
surveys are not weighted by population, the low and falling
ratio in India, where approximately a third of the world’s
poor live, is lost in the variation of the ratios elsewhere. In
consequence, it is possible for the survey-to-national-
accounts ratios to be insignificantly different from one even
though the surveys and national accounts data have radi-
cally different implications for trends in global poverty.
National accounts estimates of consumption are available
for most countries in most recent years, so the countries and
dates of the comparison are set by the availability of the
surveys. The surveys used here come from a convenience
sample assembled from various sources. In most cases, I
have survey estimates of mean income or mean consump-
tion from the estimates assembled by Chen and Ravallion
(2001), and which appear on the World Bank’s poverty
monitoring Web site. To these I have added my own esti-
mates for India, most of which appear in Deaton and Dre`ze
(2002), a number of OECD surveys, particularly from the
Consumers Expenditure Survey and Current Population
Surveys in the United States, and the Family Expenditure
Survey (now the Expenditure and Food Survey) in the
United Kingdom, as well as a number of additional survey
estimates supplied by the Bank, but not used in their poverty
counts, for example, estimates of mean consumption per
head from the official Chinese surveys. In all, I have 557
survey-based estimates of mean consumption per head or
mean income per head (occasionally both). Table 1 shows
that these come from 127 countries; that the earliest year is
1979 and the latest 2000. The number of surveys in the data
set grows steadily larger over time; I have only 3 in 1979
and 7 in 1980, but 57 in 1998 (the peak year). There are 22
surveys for 1999 and 26 in 2000, but this diminution in
numbers after 1998 reflects merely the delay in processing
and obtaining survey data, rather than any slackening in the
growth of usable surveys around the world. For a single
country, consumption and income estimates may comes
from the same survey (for example, in China) or from
different surveys (for example in the United States). The
fraction of the world’s population covered by the surveys
shows a strong upward trend, more than doubling from 1980
to 1998, but there is fluctuation in the fraction from year to
year as individual countries move in and out of the counts.
Much depends on whether or not there is an Indian survey
in a specific year. China is included in 1980, and from 1985
onward.
Table 2 shows information on the ratios of survey esti-
mates of consumption or income per head to consumption
or income per head from the national accounts. The ratios










1979 3 3 0.35 9.0
1980 7 6 1.33 34.1
1981 5 5 0.27 6.7
1982 3 3 0.33 8.1
1983 2 2 0.97 23.6
1984 7 5 0.48 11.4
1985 13 11 1.59 37.4
1986 21 18 1.75 40.3
1987 23 21 1.82 41.2
1988 26 24 2.92 64.9
1989 31 28 2.14 45.7
1990 23 20 1.69 35.1
1991 29 26 1.95 38.6
1992 37 34 2.16 42.1
1993 45 41 2.61 49.9
1994 35 30 3.22 60.2
1995 51 45 3.67 67.7
1996 48 44 3.82 68.3
1997 43 38 3.38 61.1
1998 57 53 3.86 70.3
1999 22 19 2.16 39.1
2000 26 23 3.54 63.6
All 557 127 — —
Notes: Surveys are a convenience sample where survey means were readily available. When the
number of surveys exceeds the number of countries, some countries have estimates of both mean income
and mean consumption per capita. China is included in 1980, 1985, and every year thereafter; India in
1983, 1988, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and 2000, but not in 1999. (Indian surveys that run from
midyear to midyear have been arbitrarily allocated to the second year.) There are 278 estimates of mean
consumption, and 281 estimates of mean income.
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are calculated using nominal values in local currency units
(lcu) for both the numerator and denominator. National
accounts estimates of household final consumption are the
obvious counterparts to survey consumption. For income,
most countries do not publish data on disposable household
income, so that possible counterparts are GDP or, once
again, household consumption. The argument for the latter
is that much of saving may not be done by households, but
by corporations, government, or foreigners, so that house-
hold income may be closer to household consumption than
to national income. The top panel shows summary statistics
for ratios of survey to national accounts consumption per
head, the second panel is for the ratios of survey income to
national accounts consumption, and the third panel is for
ratios of survey income to GDP.
Consumption estimated from the surveys is typically
lower than estimated from the national accounts; the aver-
age ratio is 0.860, (with a standard error of 0.029), or 0.779
(0.072) when weighted by population. (India has particu-
larly low ratios.) The exception is sub-Saharan Africa,
where the average ratio of survey to national accounts
consumption is 1 in the unweighted and greater than 1 in the
weighted calculations. For the OECD, where survey and
national accounts quality are presumably the highest, the
surveys pick up only a little more than three-quarters of
consumption in the national accounts. These differences
come in part from differences in definition—for example,
national accounts consumption includes such items as the
imputed value of owner-occupied housing, which is nearly
always excluded from the surveys—but they also reflect
errors and omissions in both surveys and national accounts.
In consequence, that the ratios for the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are
close to 1 says nothing about the quality of the surveys in
those two regions. Indeed, it is possible that the perfectly
measured ratio is less than 1, but is actually measured as
greater than 1 because there is understatement in the na-
tional accounts. And it is entirely possible that the high
ratios for SSA come from large-scale underestimation in the
national accounts.
Income measured in the surveys is on average larger than
consumption measured in the surveys, but is in most cases less
than national accounts consumption, and much less than GDP.
Survey income is less than 60% of GDP on average.

















All 277 0.860 (0.029) 0.306 0.779 (0.072) 0.191
EAP 42 0.819 (0.069) 0.224 0.863 (0.031) 0.110
EECA 59 0.847 (0.038) 0.230 0.796 (0.040) 0.184
LAC 26 0.767 (0.094) 0.329 0.585 (0.078) 0.193
MENA 20 0.955 (0.104) 0.300 0.867 (0.111) 0.270
OECD 33 0.781 (0.052) 0.097 0.726 (0.032) 0.076
SA 23 0.649 (0.063) 0.122 0.569 (0.036) 0.103
SSA 74 1.000 (0.061) 0.415 1.089 (0.089) 0.459
Income to Consumption
All 266 0.904 (0.034) 0.290 1.008 (0.044) 0.174
EAP 32 1.036 (0.065) 0.244 1.057 (0.019) 0.105
EECA 47 0.852 (0.038) 0.231 0.811 (0.030) 0.196
LAC 100 0.893 (0.084) 0.392 1.004 (0.143) 0.416
OECD 75 0.891 (0.020) 0.137 0.910 (0.011) 0.084
SA 8 0.892 (0.028) 0.118 0.874 (0.009) 0.101
SSA 4 1.000 (0.136) 0.420 1.023 (0.204) 0.359
Income to GDP
All 272 0.569 (0.023) 0.203 0.542 (0.023) 0.113
EAP 32 0.515 (0.031) 0.124 0.512 (0.007) 0.051
EECA 49 0.530 (0.029) 0.157 0.481 (0.016) 0.119
LAC 103 0.616 (0.055) 0.264 0.661 (0.104) 0.288
OECD 76 0.527 (0.027) 0.092 0.586 (0.018) 0.059
SA 8 0.685 (0.009) 0.100 0.659 (0.010) 0.071
SSA 4 0.837 (0.138) 0.512 0.672 (0.098) 0.228
Notes: EAP is East Asia and Pacific, EECA is eastern Europe and central Asia, LAC is Latin America and the Caribbean, OECD comprises the countries of the OECD, SA is south Asia, MENA is Middle East
and north Africa, and SSA is sub-Saharan Africa. There are no income surveys for MENA in the sample. Numbers differ slightly from table 1 because the relevant national income magnitudes are not always available.
Panel 1 shows the ratio of consumption from the survey to consumption from the national accounts, panel 2 the ratio of income from the surveys to consumption from the national accounts, and panel 3 the ratio
of income from the surveys to GDP from the national accounts. Standard errors are calculated so as to allow for correlations within countries.
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The standard deviations of the ratios provide one crude
indicator of combined survey and national accounts accu-
racy, including both sampling and nonsampling errors.
Without prejudging the relative accuracy of national ac-
counts and the surveys, the latter are more likely to vary
from year to year, for example because of sampling and
changes in survey design, and from country to country,
because survey protocols are less standardized internation-
ally than are national accounts. By this measure, the surveys
in sub-Saharan Africa are the most problematic, though the
surveys in Latin America and the Caribbean also show great
variance, particularly the income surveys. OECD surveys
have the lowest variance, followed by south Asia, where
high-quality household surveys have been in existence for
many years. In spite of the difficulties of collecting data in
transition economies, the eastern Europe and central Asia
region does not show particularly high variance. In several
countries in both EECA and LAC, high inflation poses great
problems for both survey and national accounts data.
Figures 1 (weighted by population) and 2 (unweighted)
show how the same three ratios are related to the level of
GDP, here GDP per head in 1995 PPP dollars. (This is the
World Bank’s current PPP series, divided by the implicit
price deflator of GDP in the United States.) Cross-country
and time series data are pooled in these graphs.
There are two points to take away from these figures.
First, the top left panels in both figures show a negative
relationship between the ratio of survey to national accounts
consumption on the one hand, and the GDP per capita on the
other. This relationship is steepest among the poorest coun-
tries, is flatter in middle income countries, but resumes its
downward slope among the rich countries. The continuous
lines in the two top left graphs are locally weighted non-
parametric regressions of the relationship using a bandwidth
of 1.5 (units of real log GDP in PPP). Second, there is no
similar relationship among the income surveys, either for
the ratio of survey income to national accounts consumption,
or for the ratio of survey income to GDP. At least some of the
pattern in figure 1 must come from the fact that consumption
is typically much easier to measure in surveys than is income
in poor countries, where many people are self-employed in
agriculture, whereas the opposite is true in rich countries,
where most people are wage earners and are more reluctant to
cooperate with time-consuming consumption surveys.
FIGURE 1.—RATIO OF SURVEY ESTIMATES OF MEAN INCOME OR CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA TO COMPARABLE NATIONAL ACCOUNTS ESTIMATES
498 Surveys, 124 Countries, Years from 1979 to 2000. The diameter of the circles is proportional to national population in the year of the survey.
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For assessing trends in global poverty and growth, the
most important feature of these data is the behavior of the
ratios over time. This issue is explored in figure 3 and table
3. Because the subset of countries for which we have survey
means differs from year to year, it is not useful to calculate
rates of growth of the survey means country by country and
then weight by population to obtain estimates of global
growthfromthesurveys.Instead,Ihavecomputedpopulation-
weighted averages for each year, over whatever subsets of
countries have survey data. First, the local-currency con-
sumption and income means are converted to PPP dollars by
deflation by the consumption PPP exchange rate from the
Penn World Tables, version 6.1, (PWT6.1) and then into real
terms by deflation by the U.S. CPI. They are then weighted
by population and averaged, excluding the wealthy coun-
tries of the OECD. The resulting series are plotted as the
bottom two lines in figure 3. They differ in their treatment
of country-years where there are both a consumption and an
income mean. For the broken lower line I have chosen the
consumption survey whenever both are available, and for
the solid upper line I have chosen the income survey. (The
results of choosing income means are almost identical if we
take income means for China and consumption means
elsewhere.)
For comparison with these survey-based estimates, I have
used real consumption from PWT6.1 calculated by applying
the consumption share to the chain-weighted GDP series.
The top solid line in the figure shows the population
weighted average of PWT6.1 consumption for all of the
countries that ever appear in the survey data set, excluding
only the OECD. The broken line is also a population-
weighted average of PWT6.1 consumption, but for each
year is averaged only over the countries for which there are
survey data. This calculation allows a comparison with the
survey calculations in which the two series are affected
similarly by the variation that comes from the fact that
survey countries (and thus the composition of the sum
across the world income distribution) changes from year to
year. And indeed, the year-to-year variation in the broken-
line version of the PWT6.1 consumption series is highly
correlated with both survey measures. Of course, the year-
to-year (or cyclical) fluctuations in all the series in figure 3
FIGURE 2.—RATIO OF SURVEY ESTIMATES OF MEAN INCOME OR CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA TO COMPARABLE NATIONAL ACCOUNTS ESTIMATES
498 surveys, 124 countries, years from 1979 to 2000. Unweighted.
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(except for the top line) comes as much from the changing
selection of countries with different living standards as it
does from any genuine fluctuations in the unobservable
survey mean over all countries, so that we can use these
series only to examine long-run growth, not differences in
growth rates over subperiods.
Figure 3 shows that national accounts consumption in
non-OECD countries, here taken from the PWT6.1 and
shown in the top two lines, grew more rapidly over the
1990s than did consumption from poor countries measured
from the surveys, shown in the bottom line. Table 3 shows
that growth of survey consumption is 2.3% a year if we
simply take average growth over the decade, or 1.9% a year
if we regress its logarithm on a time trend, the difference in
the two estimates coming from the variability in the series.
This difference is induced by countries with different in-
come levels, particularly India, moving in and out of the
survey averages, and is also seen in the comparison growth
rates from national accounts consumption, which are 3.8%
and 4.5% a year. Whether we take the two low or two high
estimates, the growth rate of survey consumption is approx-
imately half of the growth rate of national accounts con-
sumption. If instead of using consumption estimates from
the surveys, we take income estimates when they are avail-
able, the situation is reversed, and we get a rate of growth
from the surveys that is larger that the corresponding
growth rates in national accounts consumption. The higher
growth rate when we give preference to income surveys
comes almost entirely from the Chinese data. The World
Bank’s global poverty estimates use income surveys for
China, because there are no distributional data for the
Chinese consumption figures. However, in the Bank’s cal-
culation the Chinese income distribution is scaled down by
the ratio of consumption to income in the Chinese national
accounts, a ratio that has been rising over time, so that the
first column in table 3 and the bottom graph in figure 3 are
the relevant ones for thinking about trends in global poverty
as measured by the dollar-a-day counts.
III. Surveys versus National Accounts: India and China
Figure 4 shows the ratios of survey to national accounts
estimates for China and for India. The Chinese data, which
have a discontinuity in 1990, for which there are two
estimates, are from the same survey data base discussed
above; the national accounts data are taken from the 2002
TABLE 3.—POPULATION-WEIGHTED GROWTH RATES, 1990–2000: REAL

















log on time 1.9 4.0 3.8 2.8
Average rate
of growth 2.3 5.0 4.5 2.8
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 show the growth rates of population-weighted survey means. In column 1,
whenever there is both an income and a consumption mean for a country year pair, consumption is used.
In column 2, whenever there are two surveys, preference is given to income. In both cases, survey means
are converted to a constant-price PPP basis by dividing by the product of the U.S. CPI and the
consumption PPP exchange rate from the Penn World Tables, Version 6.1 (PWT6.1). For each year from
1990 to 2000, a population-weighted average of the survey means is calculated: note that these averages
involve different countries in different years (see table 1). The growth rates are then calculated in two
ways, by regression of the logarithm on a time trend (first row) and by calculating the average change
in the logarithm over the period. These can be quite different when the series is noisy, as is the case here,
because countries come in and out of the average. Columns 3 and 4 show comparable population-
weighted growth rates for real PPP (chain-weighted) consumption from PWT6.1. In column 3, con-
sumption from PWT6.1 is used only for country year pairs for which a survey mean exists; this column
therefore shares the variability in columns 2 and 3 that comes from the varying selection of countries.
Column 4 shows the population-weighted growth rates for consumption from PWT6.1 using all countries
for which there ever exists a survey.
FIGURE 3.—LOGARITHMS OF POPULATION-WEIGHTED AVERAGES OF CONSUMPTION OR INCOME
Household surveys and Penn World Tables, v. 6.1.
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Edition of the World Development Indicators. In China the
ratio of survey to national accounts consumption has been
declining since around 1990, from a peak of 95% in 1990 to
80% in 2000; the growth rates of the two series thus differ
by approximately 1.7% a year in the 1990s. The ratio of
survey income (from the same surveys as consumption) to
national consumption did not decline over the same period.
However, there is a great deal of household saving in China
(which shows up in the surveys in that the top line is much
higher than the bottom line), so national consumption is not
the relevant comparison. Ideally, income should be com-
pared with GDP or, better still, some national accounts
estimate of household income. Although I do not have the
data to calculate that ratio, there is little doubt that it would
also be declining over time. Given the population of China,
its increasing discrepancies between survey and national
accounts is a major contributor to the global differences.
However, it should be noted that many commentators have
argued that the growth rates in the Chinese national ac-
counts are too high. The discussions by Maddison (1998),
Wu (2000), and Keidel (2001) are all consistent with an
overestimation in the rate of GDP growth by between 2 and
4 percentage points a year, and Rawski (2001) argues for
much larger overestimation in the last few years. Removing
2 percentage points a year from NAS consumption growth
would eliminate the difference in the growth rates between
the NAS and the surveys.
Figure 4 also shows the data from India, in this case
taken, for national consumption, directly from the latest
available edition of the national accounts (Government of
India, 2003) and, for the survey estimates, from my own
calculations from the unit record data. The Indian National
Sample Survey (NSS) conducted its latest full-scale house-
hold expenditure survey in 1999–2000, but, because the
questionnaire design was changed from earlier similar sur-
veys, there has been controversy about the interpretation of
the results. The estimate of average consumption used here
was calculated according to the methods laid out in Deaton
(2003) but differs relatively little from the official calcula-
tions, much less than is the case for the poverty estimates. In
India, survey consumption is much lower relative to na-
tional accounts consumption than it was in China. However,
as in China, the ratio of the two estimates of consumption
has been declining over time. In 1983, the ratio was 0.68,
which declined in 1999–2000 to 0.56, so that national
accounts consumption has been growing at 1.1%/yr more
rapidly than survey consumption. India, like China, ac-
counts for a large share of the world’s population, and an
even larger share of those who live on less than $1 a day.
The Indian consumption ratio in figure 4 calls for some
additional comment, particularly the erratic behavior from
1995 through 1998. The Indian NSS carries out large
household expenditure surveys only once every 6 years or
so, the two most recent being in 1993–1994 and 1999–2000.
The estimates between those dates come from four smaller
NSS surveys that also collect expenditure data. Although the
sample sizes of those surveys are sufficient to obtain reliable
estimates of the national headcount ratio, there have been
questions about their design. The 1998 survey, in particular,
lasted only for half a year, and it is arguable that the
penultimate observation in the graph should be ignored.
Unfortunately, circumstances have conspired to give this
and the immediately preceding observation a great deal of
weight. Because the 1999–2000 survey was arguably con-
taminated by changes in the questionnaire, the 1997 and
1998 surveys did not fade into history as quickly as they
otherwise would have done. In addition, these were the
latest observations for India available to the World Bank for
the most recent set of global poverty counts, constructed for
the 2000–2001 World Development Report on poverty. The
use of the new data in the next round of global poverty
counts will give a more optimistic picture of the rate of
global poverty decline, though not as optimistic as would be
FIGURE 4.—RATIOS OF SURVEY MEANS TO NATIONAL ACCOUNTS MEANS OF CONSUMPTION AND/OR INCOME PER HEAD, INDIA AND CHINA
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the case if survey growth had been as rapid as growth in
national accounts.
The internal Indian debate on discrepancies between
surveys and national accounts has flared up sporadically for
at least thirty years; see in particular the papers in Sriniva-
san and Bardhan (1974) as well as those of Minhas (1988)
and Minhas and Kansal (1989). The recent spate of interest
has generated a great deal of important detailed work,
including collaborative efforts between the NSS and the
National Accounts Division of the Central Statistical Office.
Much can be learned from that work, not only for India, but
also for other countries, and I postpone discussion until
section V.
IV. Surveys versus National Accounts: the United
Kingdom and the United States
Although my primary concern is with the measurement of
global poverty, and thus with measurement in poor coun-
tries, the issue of statistical discrepancies between surveys
and national accounts is a general one, and there is a great
deal to be learned by looking at the issue at the other end of
the global income distribution. Rich countries tend to have
fuller data, so that it is sometimes possible to test general
hypotheses about surveys that cannot readily be tested in,
for example, India or China.
Figure 5 presents the results of survey and national
accounts comparisons for the United States and the United
Kingdom. The right-hand panel shows results for the Family
Expenditure Survey (FES), since 1995 subsumed into the
Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS). Data on real consump-
tion per head were taken from the EFS reports, and were
scaled up using population and retail price data from the
Annual Abstract of Statistics (Office for National Statistics,
2003). The figure shows the ratios of these numbers to final
consumers’ expenditure from the national accounts. The
redesign of the survey and the switch from the FES to the
EFS results in a discontinuity at 1995, for which year there
are two estimates. The left-hand panel shows corresponding
data from the United States using two different surveys, the
Current Population Survey (CPS) and the Consumer Expen-
diture Survey (CEX). The CEX is the main consumption
survey in the United States, although it also collects income
data, and the two solid lines in the left-hand panel show (a)
the ratio of consumption from the CEX to consumption in
the national accounts (the upper solid line) and (b) the ratio
of pretax income from the CEX to personal income from the
national accounts (the lower solid line). The CEX income
and consumption estimates are calculated by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics from the CEX, and include estimates from
both the diary and interview components of the survey, as
well as an estimate of the rental equivalents of owner-
occupied homes. The CPS, which is the main income survey
in the United States, and which is used by the Bureau of the
Census to calculate the official estimates of poverty, does
not collect data on consumption. The broken line in the
figure is the ratio of income from the CPS to personal
income in the national accounts.
Both sets of consumption figures show the now familiar
pattern of declining ratios of survey to national accounts
consumption. In the United Kingdom, the decline is far
from uniform over time, and if the break in the survey in
1995 had been in 1994, it could perhaps have been attrib-
uted to the change in design. As it is, the ratio declines by
approximately 10 percentage points over the 25 years from
1976 to 2001, so that survey consumption is growing
approximately half a percent a year less rapidly than con-
sumption in the national accounts. The decline in the cor-
responding ratio in the United States is a good deal more
dramatic, from 0.80 to 0.64 from 1984 to 2001, so that the
difference in the two growth rates is 1.3%/yr, a little more
than in India and a little less than in China. Income from the
CEX is also a declining fraction of personal income in the
national accounts, although the rate of decline is much
slower, less than 5 percentage points over 17 years. And
income in the CPS shows no trend relative to personal
income in the national accounts.
More careful comparisons between the CEX and national
accounts consumption data have been made by Triplett
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(1997) and by Garner et al. (2003). After making a number
of corrections to try to put the two series on a comparable
basis, Triplett estimates that from 1984 to 1994, personal
consumption expenditures grew at 1.0%/yr more rapidly
than consumers expenditure from the CEX. Garner et al.
comparing only comparable items, calculate that the ratio of
CEX to national accounts values was 89% in 1992. In 1997
and 2000, the comparable ratio was only 80%, so that the
differential growth rate was 2.4%/yr until 1997 and 1.5%/yr
to 2000.
The differential behavior of income and consumption
ratios may have something to do with the fact that in the
United States, consumption is much harder to collect than is
income. The CEX costs a great deal more per interview than
does the CPS, and, whereas for most people (those who are
not self-employed) income can be collected with only a few
questions, consumption requires a long interview or exten-
sive recordkeeping in diaries. The nonresponse rate in the
CEX has been rising over time (Groves & Couper, 1998),
while that for the CPS has been constant. It is possible that
people are less and less willing to cooperate with the CEX
over time, but those who do so are prepared to answer the
income questions more fully and more accurately than the
consumption questions. The CPS, which does not ask con-
sumption questions, may suffer from fewer problems. Its
sample size is also much larger, 60,000 households versus
only 5,000 up to 1999, and 7,500 thereafter.
V. Why Do Surveys and National Accounts Diverge?
The previous sections have documented the fact that
consumption measured from surveys frequently grows less
rapidly than consumption measured from the national ac-
counts. Consistent with this general relationship, the ratio of
the two magnitudes is highest in the poorest countries, and
lowest in the richest. Within countries as diverse as China,
India, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the ratio
falls over time as real income increases. Taking non-OECD
countries as a whole, population-weighted survey consump-
tion in PPP constant dollars grew at only half the rate of
population-weighted consumption in the Penn World Ta-
bles. There are conceptual differences between the two
concepts of consumption, but these do not account for the
differences in growth rates, so that one or both of the growth
rates are incorrect. If the surveys are wrong and the national
accounts right, either inequality has been widening in ways
that our data do not appear to show, or poverty has been
falling more rapidly than shown by the $1-a-day counts. If
the surveys are right, there was less growth in the world in
the 1990s than usually supposed. Extreme positions apart,
we have some combination of underestimation of poverty
decline, underestimation of a widening in the distribution of
consumption, and overestimation of growth. Quantifying
the contribution of each is an urgent task for anyone inter-
ested in growth, poverty, and inequality. In this section, I lay
out some of the possible explanations.
It is important to note that there can be no general
presumption in favor of one or other of the surveys and the
national accounts. In particular, that national accounts are
familiar, widely used, and in principle comparable (they
typically conform to the UN’s System of National Ac-
counts) does not imply that the divergences between them
and the surveys must be attributed to the latter. Although it
is certainly the case that there exist “failed” surveys, whose
execution is known to have been faulty, where fieldwork
was disrupted or inadequately supervised, where sampling
procedures were flawed, or where changes in survey design
made it impossible to compare the results with earlier
surveys, national accounts estimates are also subject to
many errors, some of which will be discussed below.
A. Unit Nonresponse
Not everyone who is asked to participate in a survey
agrees to do so, and failure to respond (unit nonresponse) is
known to be different for households with different house-
hold characteristics (Groves & Couper, 1998). Of particular
interest is the case where better-off households are less
likely to respond; Groves and Couper report that, in rich
countries, the probability of response is negatively related to
almost all measures of socioeconomic status, and though
survey organizations in poor countries can usually collect
data in very poor areas (albeit under difficult conditions), it
is often impossible to penetrate the gated communities in
which many rich people live. Suppose then that the proba-
bility that consumption y is recorded in the survey is (y),
and that (y) is monotone declining in y. This situation has
been discussed in a recent paper by Mistiaen and Ravallion
(2003), who also show how to use aggregate measures of
nonresponse (for example, by region) to correct estimates of
poverty and inequality.
If the true (untruncated) density of consumption (or
income) is f(y), the density for observed (truncated) con-
sumption is
fˆ y   y f y
y0
y1





where y0 and y1 are the bottom and top levels of consump-
tion, and  is the mean response in the population. From
equation (1), the difference in the true and actual densities is
fˆ y  f y   y  

f y, (2)
so that the observed density is higher or lower according to
whether the household’s response rate is below or above the
mean. Because (y) is monotone decreasing, the truncated
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density is higher at low levels of y, and lower at high values,
so that the distribution function is shifted to the left, that is,
Fˆ  y  F y. (3)
This inequality says that the truncated distribution is first-
order stochastic dominated by the untruncated distribution,
which implies that the estimated poverty rate from the
actual data will be no less than the estimated poverty rate in
the population, no matter what the poverty line, and that the
estimated mean consumption will be no larger than the
population mean.
Mistaen and Ravallion also consider the effects of the
truncation on the Lorenz curve L(p). In general, the deriv-









where y is the pth quantile of consumption and  is its
mean. Provided that y0  0 and y1  	, and provided
(y)  0, for all y in the support, so that the support of the
truncated distribution is identical to that of the original, the
reduction in the mean by the nonresponse implies that the
truncated Lorenz curve is at least as steep as the true Lorenz
curve both at the origin and at (1,1), so that either the
Lorenz curves are identical, or they must cross at least once.
This result, although obtained under special assumptions
(for example, if y0 
 0, it is possible to construct cases
where the curves need not cross), tells us that with greater
nonresponse by the rich, there can be no general supposition
that estimated inequality will be biased either up or down by
the selective undersampling of richer households. (The
intuition that selective removal of the rich should reduce
measured inequality, which is sometimes stated as obvious
in the literature, is false, perhaps because it takes no account
of reduction in the mean from the selection.)
If we are prepared to place restrictions on the compliance
function (y), we can analyze the effect of inequality on
compliance. In particular, suppose (a) that (y), in addition
to being monotone decreasing, is convex, and (b) that y(y)
is monotone increasing and concave. Then if F1 and F2 are
two distributions of income with the same mean, such that
F1 second-order stochastically dominates F2, we have
 y dF1 y   y dF2 y, (5)
so that the average compliance is lower for the more equal
distribution. In addition,
 y y dF1 y   y y dF2 y, (6)
so that, dividing equation (5) by (6), we have
1  2. (7)
Provided the two monotonicity assumptions and convexity
and concavity assumptions are satisfied, a mean-preserving
increase in spread in the true distribution will decrease the
truncated mean. The monotonicity assumption in (b) guar-
antees that, in spite of the noncompliance, reported income
increases with actual income. The concavity and convexity
assumptions guarantee the result, but do not appear to be
required by the logic of the problem.
To sharpen intuition further, consider the following illus-
trative but not unrealistic case in which a log normal
distribution of income is combined with a probability of
compliance that is nonincreasing in income. Suppose that x
is the logarithm of income or consumption, and that the
distribution prior to truncation is log normal with mean (of
logs) v and variance (of logs) 2. Suppose too that the
probability of responding to the survey is unity up to some
income level exp(v  ), for some number , but that
above exp(v  ), the logarithm of the compliance prob-
ability declines linearly in the logarithm of income; the kink
in the response function is needed to prevent the probability
being greater than unity. Hence if (x) is the probability that
a household with (log) income x agrees to cooperate, we
have
 x
1, x v ,
exp[x v )], x v , (8)
so that the probability of response is unity at the bottom of
the distribution. The parameter  is nonnegative, and is
(minus) the elasticity of compliance with respect to income.
In the Appendix, I show that, provided  is large enough,
so that noncompliance begins far enough below the mean,
the observed (truncated) distribution of incomes is approx-
imately log normal, and that the variance of log income is
unchanged, but the mean of logs is shifted downward from
v to v  2. Although this result is entirely driven by
assumption, it illustrates a number of important points.
First, we have a case where nonresponse drives the differ-
ence between the national accounts and the surveys, and
where the mean is biased down, but the Lorenz curve is
correct. Second, the ratio of survey consumption to true
consumption depends on the variance of the true (and
truncated) distribution. In particular, If ˆ and  are the




so that the understatement of income will be greater in
places and at times where inequality is higher. In particular,
increasing inequality of incomes will drive down the survey
estimates in relation to the truth, even though the ratio of
survey to the true mean is independent of the level of mean
income. Third, in this case, the ratio of the truncated to the
true mean is independent of mean income, so that, although
compliance is declining in income, and although average
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compliance is declining as the economy expands [at least if
the compliance probability in equation (8) is scaled to
respond to actual income, rather than the deviation of
income from the mean], the fraction of total income cap-
tured by the survey does not decrease with growth.
The compliance probability in equation (8) can be gen-
eralized, for example by introducing a quadratic term in the
second branch of (8), so that
 x  




2 x v 
2, x v .
(10)
The parameter  can be positive or negative; in the latter
case, equation (10) needs to be modified at high levels of x
to stop the probability exceeding 1. Although I do not deal
with the complication here, high values of x can be handled
in the same way as low values of x in equation (8). Under
the same condition as before, that  is large enough, equa-
tion (8) also implies that the truncated distribution will be
log normal, but now both mean and variance of logs are
changed. Similar algebra to the linear case gives
ˆ2 
2
1  2 (11)
for the variance of logs in the observed distribution, which
can be greater than or less than 2, depending on the sign of
. For the mean of logs, we have
vˆ  v 
2  
1  2 . (12)
Once again, the inequality of income affects the ratio of the
observed to the true mean. However, it is no longer appro-
priate to replace the mean by its true value, leaving the
variance unchanged, because if  is nonzero, the variance is
now also affected by the noncompliance, something that we
would generally expect to be the case. Note that, as in the
original case, the ratio of true to measured income does not
vary with the true mean, so that noncompliance can increase
with income, without the ratio of measured to true income
falling with increases in mean income.
There are no ideal aggregate data for testing the extent to
which mean income and income inequality affect survey
means through noncompliance. Although there is a great
deal of distributional information in the DS data set, the
information for developing countries is neither reliable in
itself, nor well matched to the surveys in the sample dis-
cussed above. For the smaller subset of 111 consumption
and 77 income surveys for which Gini coefficients are
provided on the World Bank’s poverty-monitoring web site,
there is no significant (unweighted, as is appropriate here)
relationship between the log of the ratio of survey to NAS
mean and the Gini coefficient, whether or not real GDP per
capita is controlled for. (Region by region, there is a mar-
ginally significant effect in South Asia, where the data
quality is probably highest; note that the OECD countries
are not represented in the poverty monitor countries.) This is
also true when the Gini is replaced by the log variance,
calculated from the formula for the log standard deviation,
 
 21g1)/2], which holds when the distribution is
log normal (Aitchison & Brown, 1969).
Another place to look is across the states of India, where
there exist state net domestic product data which can be
compared with the state means from the household surveys.
Again, this comparison is far from ideal: the state domestic
product accounts are widely believed to be measured with
considerable error; and even without error, the ideal com-
parison would not be with net domestic product, but with
consumption. An offsetting advantage, compared with the
international data, is that the state survey means and in-
equality measures are derived from the same surveys, using
identical questionnaires and procedures in each state. It
should also be noted that the Indian National Sample Survey
Organization consistently maintains that noncompliance is
rare, and that numerators make repeated visits until people
are available or it is convenient for them. The data from the
surveys also carry a notation for whether the household
actually surveyed was the one originally intended, or
whether it is a substitute for the household targeted for
sampling. In the 1999–2000 survey, only 1,200 out of more
than 70,000 rural households are listed as substitutes, with
1,900 out of 48,900 urban households. Approximately two-
thirds of the substitutions are attributed to the informant
being away, and less than a quarter to informants being busy
or uncooperative.
The state survey means are well correlated with the state
estimates; across the 43rd (1987–1988), 50th (1993–1994),
and 55th (1999–2000) rounds of the NSS, and using means
for only the 17 largest states, the correlations are 0.88 or
higher if Delhi is included, and 0.70 or higher if is excluded.
If we use the log of the ratio of survey consumption per
head to state net domestic product per head as the left-hand
side of equation (6), and the variance of logs from the
surveys as the right-hand side, the regression coefficient on
the variance of logs is 1.39 (t 
 3.3) in a pooled
regression of the three rounds (54 observations from 18
states in each of the rounds), including round dummies.
Taking each round separately, the corresponding coeffi-
cients (and t-values) are 0.69 (0.8), 0.78 (2.6), and
1.44 (2.2) for the 43rd, 50th, and 55th rounds, respec-
tively. Figure 6 shows the corresponding plots, with each
state identified. Taken literally, these estimates suggest that
the elasticity of noncompliance has almost doubled in the 12
years between 1987–1988 and 1999–2000, which is cer-
tainly consistent with a fall in the fraction of aggregate
consumption captured by the surveys. Inequality, within
urban areas and between urban and rural areas, has also
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been rising in India (Deaton & Dre`ze, 2002), which would
again depress the ratio of survey to NAS means. Of course,
these results are consistent with a wide range of other
possibilities; for example, as suggested by a referee, states
with more inequality could have higher savings rates, and in
the absence of good capital markets, a higher share of
investment and a lower share of consumption in state GDP,
or higher inequality, could generate more government ex-
penditure, with similar consequences. So the empirical ev-
idence is weak at best.
These data are not suitable for investigating the important
question of whether the ratios are lower when mean con-
sumption is higher. This is because the state net domestic
product is used in the calculation of the log ratio, so that to
include it in the regression is to guarantee a negative
correlation, whether or not one actually exists. Another
variable that is plausibly important is the degree of urban-
ization, if enumerators have greater difficulty contacting or
obtaining compliance from urban households. In fact, with
the Indian state data, it is difficult to tell the urbanization
and inequality explanations apart. Urbanization (the fraction
of population in the urban sector) can be used to replace the
variance of logs in the regression, with similar t-values, and
when both urbanization and the variance are entered to-
gether, neither is significantly different from 0. Urbanization
and inequality are highly correlated in these data, and we
cannot tell whether it is high income that poses the problem
for the surveys. With only 18 states, I am almost certainly
pushing these data too far. Nevertheless, the question of
compliance is central to the analysis of survey versus
national accounts, and the Indian experience provides some
support for the idea that income-related noncompliance
explains some part of the shortfall between the surveys and
the national accounts, and perhaps even a part of why the
shortfall is increasing.
B. Issues Involving National Accounts
Although noncompliance almost certainly explains at
least some of the discrepancies between surveys and na-
tional accounts, and although there are other problems with
the surveys beyond noncompliance, there are serious quality
issues with the national accounts estimates of consumption
and GDP. I discuss some of the most important in this
subsection.
Discrepancies between survey and national accounts es-
timates of consumption can arise both through differences
in definition, and through differences in the relative success
FIGURE 6.—RATIO OF SURVEY MEAN OF CONSUMPTION TO STATE NET DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND VARIANCE OF LOG PER CAPITA TOTAL HOUSEHOLD
EXPENDITURE (PCE), INDIA, THREE NSS SURVEY ROUNDS
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of meeting those definitions. National accounts statistics are
compiled according to protocols laid down in the 1993
version of the Systems of National Accounts, SNA93. The
SNA93 establishes what is known as the production bound-
ary, which defines what is and is not part of consumption
and GDP. The production boundary includes all goods and
services that are exchanged, as well as goods that are not
exchanged, such as food produced for home consumption,
but excludes services that are not exchanged, such as food
preparation, home education of children, or minor home
repairs, with the important exception of housing services
consumed by owner-occupiers. Because the excluded ser-
vices tend to be replaced by exchanged services as people
become better off and substitute market for home produc-
tion, the measured growth rate of consumption and GDP
will be too high, at least when the true rate of growth is
positive. Yet this bias cannot explain any of the growing
discrepancy between surveys and national accounts, be-
cause the nonexchanged services are not included in the
surveys either.
Yet the degree of effective coverage of the nonexchanged
items will almost always differ between the surveys and
national accounts. Surveys almost never directly collect
data on implicit rents for owner-occupiers (other than the
maintenance component), though it is sometimes possible to
use data from the surveys on housing characteristics to
estimate hedonic rental regressions, provided there is a local
rental market. But few of the surveys used for poverty
analysis contain such estimates, which undoubtedly contrib-
utes to the finding that survey-to-NAS consumption ratios
are typically less than 1, and if the share of the NAS
consumption attributable to rents to owner-occupiers is
increasing over time, it will also help explain the increasing
divergence. I have not made any general study of the latter,
but in India the share appears to be more or less constant
over time. In the United States the comparison of the CEX
and the NAS in figure 5 includes imputed rents in both
numbers, so that this cannot be the source of the increasing
discrepancy between them. There are also likely to be
differences in coverage of nonexchanged goods. Consump-
tion of own production, gifts, and wages in kind are an
important part of the total in poor countries, and many good
survey offices devote a great deal of attention to collecting
such information. For example, the Indian NSS distin-
guishes purchases, own production, and gifts for several
hundred items. The coverage of nonexchanged goods in the
NAS will depend on the methodology employed. Some
countries use the survey estimates, but in many and perhaps
most cases, consumption is calculated as a residual in a
process that begins from production. In principle, this is not
a problem, but in many countries it would be extremely
optimistic to suppose that the measurement of production
accurately captures home production.
Consumption surveys, as opposed to income surveys, are
likely to capture a good deal of illegal, or legal but con-
cealed (for example, to avoid taxes or regulation), activities.
Purchasers of such goods and services, unlike their produc-
ers, often have no incentives to conceal their transactions,
and individuals who have substantial income from sources
that they are unlikely to report may nevertheless report the
consumption that is financed by that income; see Blades and
Roberts (2002), OECD (2002). Because of this, and because
many surveys collect comprehensive data on nonexchanged
production, it is not surprising that, in some of the poorest
countries, consumption measured in the surveys is some-
times much larger than consumption estimated in the na-
tional accounts. As nonexchanged production becomes less
important with economic development, the effect will wear
off, and could thus account for at least some of the decline
in the ratio of the two measures. However, as Blades and
Roberts emphasize, claims that the existence of various
nonobserved activities means that a large share of GDP, as
much as a quarter or a third, is missed in the national
accounts are almost certainly exaggerated. National income
accountants understand the nature of the problems, and
although their estimates for the nonobserved economy may
not be very accurate, they do not omit it.
In addition to imputed rents of homeowners, there are two
other important items of consumption that are included in
the NAS, but not in the surveys. One is financial services
indirectly imputed, or FISIM, which is an estimate of the
consumption value of financial intermediation. FISIM is
measured as the interest paid to banks and other intermedi-
aries, less interest paid by them. The idea is that interest
charged to borrowers contains, in addition to the market rate
of interest, a charge for intermediation services to lenders,
in addition to the market rate of interest, whereas interest
paid to lenders is lower than market, with the difference
attributed to financial intermediation services to depositors.
The difference between interest paid and interest received is
therefore a measure of the value of financial intermediation
and, since the 1993 revision of the SNA, has been added to
national accounts estimates of household consumption. A
similar item is included for risk-bearing services, measured
from the profits of insurance companies. In India, the value
of FISIM increased from close to 0 in 1983/84 to 2.5% of
consumption in 1993–1994 (Kulshreshtha & Kar, 2002), so
that this item alone accounts for a quarter of a percentage
point per year of the difference in annual growth rates
between NAS and survey consumption in India. Note also
that, to the extent we are interested in measuring the living
standards of the poor, it can reasonably be doubted whether
the value of such financial intermediation is relevant. In
consequence, even if we accept the argument for the inclu-
sion of FISIM in NAS consumption, neither it nor its rate of
growth contributes to the living standards of the poor.
The second potentially important item of consumption
included in NAS but not in the surveys is consumption by
nonprofit institutions serving households (NPISH), which,
in most countries, cannot be separated from household
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consumption. It is unclear how large these items are, or
whether such expenditures are growing relative to total
consumption. In the United Kingdom, NPISH in 2001 was
3.9% of total consumption, almost double the 1970 share of
2.1%. It is possible that NPISH are much more widespread
in poorer countries (in India, it is sometimes claimed that
there is an NGO in every village), but I know of no data on
the subject.
National accounts consumption is typically estimated as a
residual using the commodity flow method. Starting from an
estimate of domestic production of each commodity, net
exports and government consumption are deducted, as are
the amounts used in investment and intermediate consump-
tion, with the residual attributed to household (and NPISH)
consumption. Many of these calculations are done in phys-
ical volumes, so that estimation of consumption in currency
units, which is what can be compared with the surveys,
requires the use of prices and price indices. There are many
opportunities for error along this chain of calculation, and,
in general, there is no means (other than surveys) of cross-
checking the final answer. The measurement of prices is a
survey-based activity with its own sampling and nonsam-
pling errors, and it is sometimes difficult to be sure that
prices are those actually paid by consumers. Not surpris-
ingly, the monetary value of NAS estimates of consumption
are subject to errors and to occasional large revision.
Sundaram and Tendulkar (2003) report that the Indian NAS
estimate of consumption of fruits and vegetables in 1993–
1994 in nominal rupees more than doubled between the
1998 and 1999 versions of the national accounts. The
estimate for clothing fell by approximately a half, and that
for rent, fuel, and power rose by more than 40%. Even with
some canceling out of pluses and minuses, total consump-
tion was revised upward by 14%, an amount which, if used
to calculate poverty rates, would cut the Indian poverty rate
by a little less than half.
For food, which is a large share of consumption in poor
countries, domestic production is typically estimated by
multiplying the acreage of land under cultivation by an
estimate of yields per acre. The former comes from a land
census or survey, which in many countries is done quite
infrequently, whereas the latter comes from crop-cutting
surveys, themselves of mixed quality. Data on government
consumption are usually relatively accurate, as are imports
and exports, which typically are subject to direct monitoring
by the government. The same cannot be said for interme-
diate (business) consumption, which is often assessed by
applying various ratios to measured production. These ratios
come from enterprise surveys or from input-output tables.
Once again, these measures are often outdated. For India,
Kulshreshtha and Kar (2002) write that their NAS consump-
tion estimated “depend on an assortment of direct and
indirect estimates along with various rates and ratios, some
of which are based on the results of studies carried out in the
distant past.”
The use of outdated ratios and correction factors is
particularly problematic when the economy is growing and
its structure changing. Kulsheshtra and Kar, in their detailed
commodity-by-commodity comparison of food consump-
tion in the NAS and the NSS in India, find that one of the
largest discrepancies is for vanaspati, a vegetable cooking
oil that is widely used in restaurants. This intermediate use
of cooking oil should be deducted in the commodity flow
calculations, but in fact there is no such correction in the
Indian national accounts. In consequence, and because con-
sumers’ expenditure in restaurants is already included in
NAS consumption, restaurant use of vanaspati is double-
counted in the national accounts. And because consumers
switch from domestic cooking to purchased meals as they
get better off, the more rapid is the growth of the economy,
the larger will the overstatement of consumption become.
The vanaspati example is an extreme case, in that there is no
correction for intermediate business consumption, but the
same exaggeration of growth will be generated by the use of
outdated rates and ratios to assess intermediate consumption
in an economy where growth is reallocating economic
activity from own production to the market.
Overstatement of consumption and consumption growth
through a failure to capture intermediate consumption will
also lead to an overstatement of the level and growth rate of
expenditure-based measures of GDP. This exaggeration is in
addition to the exaggeration associated with the general
movement of activity, such as services, from a nonex-
changed to an exchanged basis—for example as a greater
share of food preparation is done by food vendors, which is
counted in GDP, rather than by family members, which is
not. Both come from the same fundamental trend, which is
the increasing marketization, complexity, and roundabout-
ness of production with economic development. Note that
not all of these errors in constructing consumption neces-
sarily find their way into GDP. For example, how a com-
modity flow is allocated between consumption and capital
formation will affect the estimation of both, but not of their
sum.
C. Other Survey Issues
The two previous sections have documented what are
perhaps the most likely candidates for explaining the diver-
gence between national accounts and survey-based esti-
mates of consumption. However, it should also be empha-
sized that there are many other problems, some of which are
on the survey side. It is clear that details of survey design
matter for the results, and that protocols are not the same
across countries, or sometimes within countries over time.
Many of these are discussed in more detail in Deaton and
Grosh (2000).
Surveys often have less than complete coverage, exclud-
ing for example students, the military, and institutionalized
persons, expenditures by whom are included in NAS esti-
mates of consumption. In some cases, survey coverage
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excluded rural households, or parts of the country that are
expensive or dangerous to visit.
Survey questionnaires differ in the length of the recall
period over which respondents are asked to report their
consumption. The choice of recall period is often thought to
involve a tradeoff between accuracy of memory, which calls
for a short period, and the match between consumption and
purchases, which is more accurate when averaged over a
long period. But there is little understanding of the effects of
different recall periods, particularly in poor, agricultural
societies. In India between 1989 and 1998, the NSS exper-
imented with different recall periods, replacing the tradi-
tional 30 day recall period for all goods with a 7 day recall
period for food and tobacco, and with a 365 day period for
durable goods and some other infrequently purchased items.
The sample was randomly divided, and half were given the
old questionnaire and half the new, so that it is possible to
make a clean evaluation of the effects of the change. The
shorter reporting period increased reported expenditures on
food by around 30%, and total consumption by about 17%,
very much in the right direction to help resolve the discrep-
ancy with the NAS. Because there are many Indians close to
the poverty line, the 17% increase was enough to reduce the
measured headcount ratio by a half, removing almost 200
million people from poverty. What might seem to be an
obscure technical issue of survey design can have a major
effect on the measurement of poverty, not only in India, but
in the world. It should be noted, however, that the higher
consumption totals associated with the shorter recall period,
although closer to the NAS estimates, are not necessarily
more accurate. Indeed, the NSS has carried out a series of
controlled experiments in which, for many foods, the 30 day
reference period appears to be more accurate then the 7 day
period; see NSSO Expert Group on Sampling Errors (2003).
Survey questionnaires also vary in the number of items
that are separately distinguished, and there is some evidence
that the greater the degree of disaggregation, the greater is
the measured consumption in total. There is also no consis-
tency in the treatment of seasonality: some surveys visit
each household on several occasions throughout the year,
but most simply rely on spreading data collection through-
out a calendar year, a procedure that should not bias the
mean, though there will be biases in higher-order statistics.
In some surveys, respondents keep diaries of their purchases
over a period, in others, they make oral responses to inter-
viewers based on recall. Surveys vary on who is chosen as
respondent, and whether one or more household members
are interviewed. However well informed is the household
member who reports purchases, proxy reports on the pur-
chases of other family members are likely to be less accu-
rate than reports about the respondent’s own behavior.
Indeed, proxy reporting can plausibly contribute to a pro-
gressively large share of consumption being missed over
time. In a poor, rural community, where everyone eats from
the same pot and food is nearly all of the budget, the
housewife’s report will be quite accurate. This is much less
so in more diverse and better-off households, with some
family members working outside of the home and maintain-
ing partial budgetary independence.
In addition to the unit nonresponse discussed in section V
A there is item nonresponse, where household members fail
to report at least some expenditures, or provide deliberately
misleading reports, for example on alcohol consumption or
on various illegal items. Finally, and in parallel with the
national accounts, there are difficulties in finding adequate
prices for consumption items that are not purchased in the
market; some surveys use market prices to impute home
production, some use farm-gate prices, and some use valu-
ation techniques that are not clearly documented.
It would be desirable if the international statistical com-
munity could agree on a common set of best-practice
protocols for household income expenditure surveys, as a
parallel to the SNA for the national accounts. Unfortunately,
most of the problems discussed here are not sufficiently well
researched or understood to admit of uncontroversial solu-
tions, and many statistical offices are stout defenders of their
own particular practices. Yet, as I shall argue in the next
section, only household surveys allow us to measure pov-
erty, so that the task of harmonization must be undertaken if
we are to put global poverty measurement on a sound basis.
VI. Conclusions and Implications for the
Measurement of Poverty
The standard measures of poverty are based on counting
the number of people who live in households whose mea-
sured per capita consumption is less than a poverty line.
When rich households are less likely to cooperate with the
survey than poor people, survey-based estimates of con-
sumption will understate mean consumption and overstate
the fraction of people in poverty. Under some conditions,
the amount by which average consumption is understated
will be larger the greater is the inequality of the true
distribution of consumption. Unless consumption inequality
is increasing over time, or the fraction of noncooperating
households is increasing, income-based noncooperation
does not, in and of itself, imply that ratio of measured to true
consumption is increasing over time.
National accounts estimates of consumption are typically,
although not always, larger than survey-based estimates,
and there is a tendency, both across countries and over time
within important countries, for the NAS estimate of con-
sumption to grow more rapidly than does the survey-based
estimate. Survey-based estimates are subject to numerous
errors and inaccuracies, but there are also problems with
national accounts estimates. These are likely to understate
consumption in the poorest countries, and to overstate the
rate of growth of average consumption, both over time in
poor countries, and in comparisons between poor and rich
countries at a moment in time. In part, these systematic
problems in measuring the rate of growth of consumption
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carry through to GDP, whose growth rate is also systemat-
ically biased upward. I know of no plausible estimates of the
size of the bias.
Given the conflict between survey and NAS estimates of
consumption, it is tempting to allow the NAS estimates to
play at least some role in poverty measurement, instead of
using only the survey data. Indeed, the combination of
means from the national accounts and Lorenz curves from
the surveys has a long history, including Ahluwalia et al.
(1979), the Indian government prior to 1993, and most of
Latin America until today. In some cases, this procedure
was adopted because the survey means were unavailable,
and in others, such as the Indian case, the practice was
abandoned after searching criticism of the quality of the
national accounts; see in particular Minhas (1988), who
memorably describes the earlier practice as “mindless tink-
ering.” In general, there is argument on averaging of mul-
tiple estimates (although only estimates of the same thing),
so that extensive prior adjustment of any NAS mean would
be required before using it to scale up survey estimates.
However, there is need for a good deal of caution, and
mechanical use of unadjusted NAS means, combined with
survey-based estimates of the distribution around the mean,
will certainly give the poor measures of poverty. There are
at least three reasons why.
First, and most generally, the national accounts are de-
signed to generate estimates of macroeconomic aggregates,
not estimates of poverty, and the SNA rules are designed
with that in mind. National accounts track money, not
people. To take an example, the SNA recognizes that pro-
duction for own consumption is difficult to measure, and
recommends that the effort be made only “when the amount
produced is likely to be quantitatively important in relation
to the total supply of the good in the country” (OECD, 2002,
p. 179). Such a rule makes little sense when our prime
objective is to measure poverty. At the other end of the
spectrum, items like FISIM and the rental value of owner-
occupier homes are (properly) included, although in most
cases they are either not consumed by the poor, or make up
less of their budgets. In general, the NAS is more likely to
capture larger transactions than smaller ones, which is close
to the opposite of what happens in the surveys, where large
transactors are the least likely to be included.
Second, the differences in coverage and definition be-
tween NAS and surveys mean that, even if everything were
perfectly measured, it would be incorrect to apply inequality
or distributional measures, which are derived from surveys
that measure one thing, to means that are derived from the
national accounts, which measure another. When national
accounts and surveys are measuring different things, it is
perfectly possible for the poor to do less well than the
average, without any increase in measured inequality.
To illustrate, suppose that we are interested in measuring
consumption growth among the bottom 100p% of the pop-
ulation. We have data on mean consumption  from the
national accounts, and data on the share sp of the bottom
100p% of households from surveys. Mean consumption of
the bottom 100p% is then estimated to be
p  sp/p , (13)











In equation (14), the first term on the right-hand side comes
entirely from the surveys, and the second entirely from the
national accounts. The survey mean ˆ and the direct survey
measure of ˆp 
 spˆ, the average consumption of the
bottom 100p%, are discarded, even though the poor rarely
refuse to respond, and provide accurate estimates of their
consumption. Moreover, the validity of equations (13) and
(14) depends on being able to apply the survey shares to the
NAS means, which assumes not only that the NAS means
are perfectly measured, but that both are measuring the
same thing. So even if we were to accept that NAS con-
sumption is the concept that we want, and even if we were
to believe that it is accurately measured, the shares from the
survey would be shares of consumption excluding con-
sumption on rents of owner-occupiers, excluding FISIM and
the profits of insurance companies, and excluding the ex-
penditures of NPISH. Using the survey shares to allocate
NAS consumption to the poor and nonpoor assumes that
these items are distributed between poor and nonpoor in the
same way as are the goods measured in the survey, an
assumption that is not true.
Third, we must recognize that neither the mean consump-
tion nor its distribution are accurately measured, either in
the surveys or in the NAS. A particular difficulty comes
from the mechanical use of the distributional shares and
Gini coefficients that come from the DS and WIDER com-
pilations. (Shares can be calculated from Gini coefficients if
a particular distribution is assumed, for example, the log
normal.) For most poor countries, these measures are of
dubious quality, as indeed is recognized by DS. And neither
DS nor the WIDER compilation provides the information
that would be required to make an informed judgment on
the way their numbers were calculated. So if equation (14)
is used to construct ˙p/p, and the measures of sp are noisy,
a regression of ˙p/p on ˙/ will have a coefficient that is
close to 1, essentially by construction, and the worse is the
measurement error, the closer the estimate will be to 1. So
there is no credibility to the claim that globalization has
been good for the poor based on a calculation that applies
badly measured distributional shares to (upward-biased)
measures of growth from the national accounts. The glob-
alization debate is serious enough that we must genuinely
measure the living standards of the poor, not simply assume
them. We cannot prove that growth trickles down by
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assuming that growth trickles down, nor argue that global-
ization has reduced poverty without measuring the living
standards of the poor.
If the task were the purely statistical one of estimating
mean consumption, there would be much to be said for
using the average of the mean consumption from the sur-
veys and that from the adjusted national accounts (Deaton,
2001). But if we need to measure poverty in a way that will
convince those who are skeptical of the idea that average
growth reaches the poor, there is little choice but to use the
surveys. This argument is reinforced by the fact that for
many countries it is impossible to adjust NAS consumption
estimates to make them comparable with the survey totals.
None of this says that the surveys are correct, nor that
current measures of global poverty are doing a good job of
measuring the trends. And because not every country has a
survey in every year, they are clearly unsuitable for mea-
suring year-to-year variations (see figure 3). There is too
much incompatibility in survey design across countries. The
downward bias in survey measures of consumption almost
certainly biases upward the World Bank’s global poverty
estimates, and in as much as it is unlikely that all of the
growth discrepancy between the surveys and the NAS is due
to faults in the latter, the rate of poverty decline is likely
downward biased. We need an international initiative to
provide a set of consistent international protocols for survey
design, as well as deeper study of the effects of nonsampling
errors, particularly noncompliance.
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APPENDIX
Log-normally Distributed Income with Selective Compliance
Suppose that x is the logarithm of income, and that x is normally
distributed in the population with mean  and variance 2. The compli-
ance probability as a function of income is given by equation (1) in the
main text. In general, if the true density if f(x), the density function of the
truncated distribution is given by




  x f x. (A-1)
In this normal case with the response function given by equation (1) in the
main text, the truncated density is
fˆ x  
1
p 22 exp 12 x  
2, x  ,
1
p 22 exp 12 x  
2
 exp[x  , x  ,
(A-2)
where p is the population-average compliance probability. The second part
of equation (A-2) can be rewritten
fˆ x  1




 exp  12 22, x  .
(A-3)
If we integrate fˆ(x) over the full range of x, we can derive an expression
for the mean compliance probability
p  ()   exp   12 22 , (A-4)
where the first term comes from integrating the first part of equation (A-2),
and the second from integrating equation (A-3). These three equations
completely characterize the truncated density fˆ(x).
If we substitute equation (A-4) into (A-3), we get the density of a
normal distribution with mean   2 and variance 2, scaled by the
factor
exp 12 22
()  exp  12 22

1
() exp 12 22 
.
(A-5)
As  becomes large, the second term in the denominator on the right goes
to 1, while the first term goes to 0. Hence, for large , with little of the
density to the left of   , the truncated density is approximately
equation (A-3), which is approximately
fˆ x  122 exp 12 x  
2
 
2, x  , (A-6)
so that the truncated distribution of log income is also normal, with the
same variance 2 as the true distribution, but with mean   2 instead
of .
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